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Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic
Fourteenth Amendment
Pamela S. Karlan*
INTRODUCTION

Sometimes there's an interesting mismatch between what a caseis about and
what it comes to stand for. Think about the case that appears most frequently in
U.S. Reports, United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.' The question presented was
whether respondent's title to various timber lands should be set aside because the

parties from whom it purchased the land had acquired it in violation of the
Timber Act of June 3, 1878.' But the case gets cited for an important
transsubstantive proposition: that the syllabus at the beginning of a Supreme
Court decision "constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader."3 Or,
more famously, consider United States v. Carolene Products Co. 4 The immediate
issue was the constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act of 1923.' But the case has
legs because of its famous footnote 4,6 which serves as a cornerstone for
contemporary justifications of judicial review.7

*
Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law School. I presented
a version of this article as a lecture at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law and thank many of
the participants for their comments. I also thank Viola Canales for many helpful suggestions.
I. 200 U.S. 321 (1906). Justice Ginsburg describes Detroit Lumber as "the most frequent citation in all
of U.S. Reports, running far ahead of Marbury v. Madison or Gibbons v. Ogden." Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Communicating and Commenting on the Court's Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2120 (1995).
2. 20 Stat. 89 (1878).
3. The precise boilerplate that appears at the beginning of each syllabus states: "The syllabus
constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337." The actual statement
from Detroit Lumber is that "the headnote is not the work of the court, nor does it state its decision-though a
different rule, it is true, is prescribed by statute in some States. It is simply the work of the reporter, gives his
understanding of the decision, and is prepared for the convenience of the profession in the examination of the
reports." By contrast, in Ohio, only the syllabus (and not the succeeding opinion) constitutes the law of the case.
See Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions Rule l(B)(1) ("The syllabus of a Supreme Court
opinion states the controlling point or points of law decided in and necessarily arising from the facts of the
specific case before the Court for adjudication."); Thackery v. Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334, 336 (1931)
(stating: "This court ... announces the law only through the syllabi of cases and through per curiam opinions.
Individual opinions speak the conclusions of their writer. What useful purpose they serve is an open question.");
see also Ginsburg, supra note I, at 2120-21 (discussing the Ohio rule).
4.
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1994).
6.
304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. Footnote 4 identified types of legislation that might not enjoy the normal
presumption of constitutionality: a statute that "appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments," a law that "restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or a statute that targets "discrete and
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This essay's starting point is a third such case, Railway Express Agency v.
New York.' That case concerned a New York City traffic regulation that forbade
motor vehicles from displaying advertising on their sides unless the
advertisement was for the owner's business.9 The Court unanimously upheld the
regulation against both due process and equal protection attacks.' ° The majority
opinion is not particularly interesting, except as an example of just how toothless
rationality review can be. The real importance of the case lies in Justice Jackson's
concurrence, which advanced a powerful vision of the relationship between due
process and equal protection:
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will
apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no
better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be
equal in operation."
In this essay, I extend Justice Jackson's observation by suggesting that the
relationship between equality and liberty, and more specifically, between the
equal protection and due process clauses, is in fact bi-directional. Like the two
hands that emerge from the sheet of paper to draw one another in M.C. Escher's
famous 1948 lithograph, Drawing Hands,2 the ideas of equality and liberty
expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and
reinforce the other. More concretely, this essay suggests that sometimes looking
at an issue stereoscopically-through the lenses of both the due process clause
and the equal protection clause-can have synergistic effects, producing results
that neither clause might reach by itself.

insular minorities" as to whom prejudice might tend "seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon .. "
7.
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982). In contrast to Detroit Lumber,
which has occasioned no scholarship regarding the original decision, there has been provocative scholarship
about the question directly addressed in Carolene Products. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene
Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397.
8.
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
9.
See id. at 108 n.2. Railway Express was a nationwide trucking and delivery service. It wanted to
display advertisements on the sides of its trucks for such concerns as Camel Cigarettes, Ringling Brothers and
Barnum & Bailey Circus, and the United States Navy.
10. Id. at 109-10.
1I. Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring).
12. For a copy of this lithograph, see http://www.worldofescher.com/gallery/DrawingHands.html.
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It is worth locating this claim within the voluminous case law and rich

scholarship about due process and equal protection. The existing discussion has
done a fairly comprehensive job of laying out the possible relationships between
the two clauses. 3 At one end of the spectrum lies cases that seem to treat the
clauses as virtually fungible-different verbal formulations that produce4
essentially identical results. In this vein, consider Brown v. Board of Education
and Boiling v. Sharpe5 in which, on the same day, the Supreme Court located the
prohibition on de jure segregation of public schools in the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment (for locally run school systems) and the due
process clause of the Fifth (for the federally run school system in Washington,
D.C.). Or consider Gideon v. Wainwright" and Douglas v. California" in which,
also on the same day, the Supreme Court announced that the due process clause
requires states to provide indigent criminal defendants with lawyers at trial and
that the equal protection clause requires states to provide lawyers on criminal
appeals as of right. A powerful strand of scholarship provides a theoretical
underpinning for this approach. For example, both Kenneth Karst and Charles
Black read the various clauses of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to
provide an integrated notion of citizenship and equal dignity before the law that
embraces notions of both liberty and equality. 8 At its logical extreme, though,
this approach might treat one or the other clause as surplusage, since the
decisional law would look the same even in its absence. The two clauses become,
rather than inform, one another.
The other strand of the existing work on due process and equal protection
stresses the differences between the two clauses. In his thought-provoking article,
Ira Lupu argues that the two clauses are aimed at distinct problems to begin
with.' 9 But even those scholars who see the clauses as serving a single
overarching commitment tend, at the level of strategy or tactics, to emphasize
distinctions. Thus, for example, Professor Karst echoes Justice Jackson in seeing
the equal protection clause as a more dialogic approach to regulation of the
political branches: "invalidating a law on an equal protection ground leaves room

13. For examples of scholarship that I have found particularly helpful in thinking through my own
position, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection,47 UCLA L.
REV. 1183 (2000); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the Constitutional Structure of Political
Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1997); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the
Strands of the FourteenthAmendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and
the Constitution:A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1161 (1988); David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
18. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); Karst,
supra note 13.
19. See Lupu, supra note 13 (describing the distinctions between the two clauses).
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for the legislature to maneuver," while striking it down as a violation of
substantive due process may foreclose regulation altogether.' ° More recently,
Cass Sunstein argues that the due process clause is backward-looking and relies
on tradition to safeguard individuals "against novel developments brought about
by temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history,"
while the equal protection clause is forward-looking and serves to "invalidate
practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were
expected to endure."2 And Bill Eskridge, in the course of disputing Sunstein's
characterization, describes a sequential relationship between the two clauses in
which the due process clause (particularly in its more procedural aspects) often
serves as a better opening wedge in a campaign to obtain full equality:
[The due process clause] offers marginalized Americans multiple points
of challenge to traditional exclusionary and persecutory state practices at
the retail level, which is complemented by an evolutive equal protection
that offers such groups the possibility that, if traditional norms against
them weaken, the judiciary will force the political process to clean up
remaining exclusionary policies on a wholesale level."
Although much of the existing scholarship assumes, at least as a theoretical
matter, that "[t]he rhetorics of rights and equality do not pose an 'either-or' choice
[and that] both are needed in the defense of constitutional values,"' 3 it does not
really apply that principle to concrete cases. Instead, it usually argues that a court
faced with a constitutional challenge should apply one clause rather than the
other, either because the claim is intrinsically better addressed under one rubric 24
or because, as a tactical matter, precedent forecloses resort to the other clause.2
This essay challenges the conventional approach by asking about the
potential effects of bringing both clauses to bear simultaneously. I begin with two

20. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 281 (1983).
21. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1163.
22. Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1186.
23. Karst, supra note 20, at 284.
24. In this vein, compare, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have used the
equal protection clause, rather than the due process clause, to strike down restrictions on a woman's ability to
obtain an abortion), with Lupu, supra note 13 (arguing that the due process clause generally provides a more
appropriate basis for the cases decided by the Warren and early Burger Courts as matters of substantive equal
protection).
25. This seems to be the basis for Cass Sunstein's arguments about using the equal protection clause to
circumvent the Supreme Court's rejection of a substantive due process claim in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986). See Sunstein, supra note 13; Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 64-66 (1996) (discussing the Court's disregard of Bowers in its equal protection decision in Romer v.
Evans). More broadly, as I explain infra, text accompanying notes 29-35, the substantive equal protection cases
of the late Warren Court are really substantive due process cases in drag; the Court chose to characterize these
fundamental rights cases as equal protection cases to avoid invoking a clause that was in bad odor because of
the Lochner-era decisions.
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cases where the Court viewed the issue stereoscopically. Harper v. State Board of
Elections16 shows how this approach can trigger doctrinal development-in that
case, the articulation of a heightened standard of review for cases involving
restrictions on the franchise. M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,27 by contrast, reflects a doctrinal
area-the access of indigent litigants to the courts-in which the Court's
jurisprudence remains anchored in simultaneous reliance on principles of due
process and equal protection because fundamental rights analysis can provide a
limiting principle for claims of equality.
I then turn to two cases where the Court failed to view the issue before it
stereoscopically. In Romer v. Evans,28 recognizing the liberty interests at stake
would have put the Court's equal protection decision on a firmer footing, by
providing a conceptual underpinning for the holding that singling out gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals constituted impermissible animus, rather than a legitimate
° the Court's failure
distinction.29 By contrast, in Bush v. Gore,&
to see the due
process-based dimensions of the right to vote blinded it to two fatal flaws in its
equal protection analysis of the Florida recount.
I. HARPER V. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND DOCTRINAL INNOVATION

In 1875, the Supreme Court unanimously declared that "the Constitution of
the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one."'" Over the
next ninety years, the Supreme Court nonetheless did strike down a number of
different restrictions on the franchise,32 but virtually all these restrictions involved
intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and whether the Court specifically
invoked the Fifteenth Amendment or not, that Amendment's prohibition on

26. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
27. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
28. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29. Justice Jackson's concurrence itself explains the fundamental weakness of the Court's failure to
address the equal protection claim in Bowers v. Hardwick, the predecessor to Romer v. Evans. Justice White's
opinion for the Court recast the Georgia statute at issue so that it applied only to gays and lesbians before it
upheld the law against a due process challenge. This suggests that the Court would have been unwilling to
uphold the statute if it applied to everyone, rather than only to a minority.
30. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
31. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875). Minor was a case challenging the refusal to extend the
right to vote to women. The plaintiff brought her claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As I suggested earlier in discussing the tactical dimension of the choice among
Fourteenth Amendment provisions, Minor's foreclosure of the privileges and immunities clause may be one of
the engines driving the Warren court's resort to the equal protection clause as the guarantor of voting rights. For
a recent discussion of the possibility of treating the right to vote as a privilege or immunity of citizenship, see
Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for
Presidential Electors, 29 FL. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 535 (2001); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The
Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FL ST. UNIV. L. REV. 587 (2001)
(explaining why I disagree with Shane).
32. For discussion of those cases, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCrURE OF THE POLICAL PROCESS 90-129 (rev. 2d ed. 2001).
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denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race heavily informed the

Court's decisions.
When it came to other sorts of restrictions on the franchise, the Supreme
Court upheld them when it could formulate "some relation" to a permissible
governmental purpose, such as ensuring a well-informed electorate or collecting
revenue.33 But in Harper, the Court struck down Virginia's imposition of a poll
tax as a prerequisite for voting in state elections4 as a violation of the equal
protection clause.
Although Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court made some feints in
the direction of asserting that there was no rational basis for imposing a poll tax,35
36
the Court, in fact, employed a different and more demanding level of scrutiny.
The opinion offered two distinct reasons for its conclusion that restrictions on the
franchise should be subjected to more searching review. First, it described the
right to vote as "a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."" Thus,
"any alleged infringement ... must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 38
Second, it declared that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like

33. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1959) (emphasis added)
(upholding a literacy test because "[t]he ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards
designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot"). For other examples of this lenient approach, see, e.g.,
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (upholding Georgia's imposition of a poll tax and observing that
"[e]xaction of payment before registration undoubtedly serves to aid collection [of the tax] from electors
desiring to vote" and that "use of the State's power is not prevented by the Federal Constitution"); Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-34 (1904) (upholding lengthy durational residency requirements and stating that
the "right of a State to legislate upon the subject of the elective franchise as to it may seem good" is
"unassailable" as long as the state does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment).
34. The Twenty-fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, forbid conditioning the right to vote in elections for
federal office on payment of "any polltax or other tax." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § I. And only a year before
Harper, in Harman v. Forssenius,380 U.S. 528 (1965), the Supreme Court struck down Virginia's attempt to
circumvent the Twenty-fourth Amendment by imposing a certificate of residency requirement on citizens who
sought to register without paying the commonwealth's polltax. In the course of that decision, the Court
discussed the origins of Virginia's polltax, stating that "[lt]he Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to
disenfranchise the Negro." Id. at 543. Given that finding, the Court's decision in Harper never to mention the
racist origins of the poll tax suggests that the Court may consciously have been using the case to announce a far
broader principle.
35. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 (asserting that "IvIoter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to
paying or not paying this or any other tax").
36. Had it applied the sort of rationality review it had used seven years earlier in Lassiter, it surely would
have upheld the polltax. If the question is whether there is any conceivable relationship between paying taxes
and qualification to vote, the answer cannot be that there is none. As observed in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S.
277 (1937), which Harper explicitly overruled, surely making the right to vote contingent on paying taxes
creates some incentive for aspiring electors to pay their taxes. See also Harper, 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (pointing to the revenue collection rationale); id. at 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing to the
likely greater propensity of taxpayers to be informed about the issues to be decided by elections, the rationale
the Court found persuasive in Lassiter).
37.

Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.

38.

Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)).
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those of race, are traditionally disfavored."" Thus, "the requirement of fee paying
causes an 'invidious' discrimination.""
While Harper is a "pure" equal protection case-the Court's opinion
mentions the due process clause only in the course of observing that neither it nor
the equal protection clause freezes into place "historic notions" of what the
Constitution forbids or commands4 -that seems largely an artifact of the Warren
court's decision to avoid the then-discredited idea of substantive due process in
favor of a substantive equal protection that carried less baggage. 4 Today, of
course, the identification of a fundamental liberty interest-and that is what the
Court's description of the right to vote sounds like4_Would trigger the operation
of the due process clause. Thus, Harper is de facto stereoscopic, even if it is not
stereoscopic de jure.
Moreover, it seems plausible that the interaction of ideas of liberty and
equality was a key element both of the Court's initial decision to ratchet up the
level of judicial review in cases like Harper and Reynolds v. Sims,44 and in the
contours of the right to which strict scrutiny applies. In the long run, Harper's
first rationale-that voting involves a fundamental liberty interest-has become
current black-letter law, 45 while its second rationale-that distinctions on the
basis of wealth are suspect-is an evolutionary dead end, interred by the Burger
Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.46 But it may well be that
before it petered out, the suspect-classification argument contributed to the
Court's adoption of a fundamental rights perspective. That is, the importance of

39. Id. at 668.
40. Id. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)not a voting case-for the point that racial classifications are disfavored, and cited Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California,372 U.S. 353 (1963); and Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)-none of them voting cases-for the point that lines drawn on the basis of
wealth are disfavored.
41. Harper,383 U.S. at 669. In dissent, Justice Black argued that the Court's decision "seem[ed] to be
using the old "natural-law-due-process formula" while claiming to base its holding on the equal protection
clause. Id. at 675. (Black, J., dissenting).
42. See Lupu, supra note 13, at 1068.
43. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667 (stating that "[lhong ago in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, the
Court referred to 'the political franchise of voting' as a 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights."').
44. See 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Ultimately in the one-person, one-vote cases, the Court fashioned a
kind of hybrid heightened scrutiny requirement, drawing its means language from the strict scrutiny (any
deviations from equal population must be "necessary") and its ends language from rationality review (to the
achievement of a "legitimate" state purpose). See Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1996).
45. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 53 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (stating that once a state has established
popular elections-in that case to choose presidential electors-"the right to vote as the legislature has
prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each
vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter") (emphasis added). The per curiam never identifies the other
sources of the right's fundamental nature, but surely it would see the right to vote as a species of either liberty or
property. For a recent discussion of this issue, see Shane, supra note 31, at 537-50.
46. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

2002 /A StereoscopicApproach to Equal Protectionand Due Process
protecting the right to vote may have been driven home by the Court's sense that
the distinction that kept some citizens from the polls was a particularly invidious
one.
In the course of the next decade, in cases like Kramer v. Union Free School
District47 and Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court articulated a formal
requirement of strict scrutiny: "if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to
some citizens and denies the franchise to others, 'the Court must determine49
state interest.'
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
And yet, the Supreme Court has never applied strict scrutiny to all laws that
distinguish among citizens in affording the franchise. The Court's definition of
the right to vote to which strict scrutiny attaches under the equal protection clause
depends on an extrinsic definition of what the liberty interest is. Consider, for
example, Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa.'° In that case, the Court upheld
the exclusion from the franchise of voters who lived within the city's police
jurisdiction, but outside its formal municipal boundaries. The Court declined
even to apply strict scrutiny, because it found that the fundamental right to vote
identified in its prior cases extended only to citizens living within a jurisdiction's
corporate limits. Instead, it applied garden-variety rationality review and upheld
the challenged arrangement. In short, the substance of substantive equal
protection must come from some place outside the clause, and one prime source
is the understanding of liberty embodied in the due process clause.

II. M.L.B. v S.L.J. AND DOCTRINAL CONSTRAINT
A stereoscopic approach has both liberating and limiting effects. The history
of judicial review in cases involving restrictions on the franchise illustrates the
former. As I suggested in Part I, the Court's nascent (and ultimately barren)
concern with discrimination against the indigent may have reinforced its sense
that voting constitutes a fundamental liberty interest and thereby prompted its
shift from rationality review to heightened scrutiny.
In this Part, I take up an example of the limiting potential. As my colleagues
John Jeffries and Daryl Levinson explain in a pair of deeply insightful articles,
concerns with potential remedial costs powerfully affect the Court's delineation
of rights in the first place.5' An interactive approach to due process and equal
protection may provide a technique for putting the brakes on what might
otherwise become an unbounded claim to state resources. At the same time, the

47.

395 U.S. 621 (1969).

48.
49.

405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Id. at 337 (quoting Kramer,395 U.S. at 627).

50. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
51. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98-100 (1999);
Daryl J.Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 873-74, 884-89
(1999).
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availability of a limiting principle may be a necessary precondition for the
recognition of the right in the first place. The somewhat confusing line of cases
involving indigent litigants' access to adjudication provides an illustration of this
double-edged effect. On the one hand, fundamental rights analysis has constrained
the list of proceedings that courts are required to equalize. On the other hand, the
presence of a fundamental interest may give a positive content to the otherwise
negative conception of constitutional rights.
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. is the most recent in a long line of litigation-access decisions.
In the "foundation case,"5 Griffin v. Illinois,53 the Court held that an Illinois rule
that conditioned a full-scale criminal appeal on the defendant's obtaining a trial
transcript (which he had to pay for) violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Over
the next four decades, Griffin spawned a series of decisions following and
distinguishing it.55
M.L.B. concerned Mississippi's termination of M.L.B.'s parental rights. After
the state trial court ruled against her, M.L.B. filed a timely appeal. State law,
however, conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation
fees of about $2400. Her application to proceed in forma pauperis was denied,
and her appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court
candidly identified the conjunction of equal protection and due process values in
litigation-access cases:
[I]n the Court's Griffin-line cases, due process and equal protection
principles converge. The equal protection concern relates to the
legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their
inability to pay core costs. The due process concern homes in on the
essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse
state action. A precise rationale has not been composed, because cases of
this order cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis. Nevertheless, most decisions in this area, we have recognized,
rest on an equal protection framework, as M. L. B.'s plea heavily does,

52.

M.L.B.,519U.S.at1lO.

53. 351 U.S. 12(1956).
54. Griffin was clearly a stereoscopic decision: the plurality opinion always mentioned the due process
and equal protection clauses together. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13, 15, 17, 18 (plurality opinion).
55. Compare, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (invalidating a rule limiting the provision of
transcripts for appeals in criminal cases to felony appeals only); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(striking down a Connecticut filing fee as it applied to divorce cases); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
(striking down an Oregon double-appeal bond requirement in tenant eviction cases); and Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660 (1983) (forbidding a revocation of probation for an indigent defendant who, through no fault of
his own, could not pay the fine imposed as parn of his sentence), with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973)
(upholding a federal filing fee in bankruptcy cases); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam)
(upholding Oregon's twenty-five dollar filing fee for civil appeals); and Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)
(declining to require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants seeking discretionary review).
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for ... due process does not independently require that the State provide
a right to appeal."
And yet, the due process clause, particularly in its substantive guise, was
critical for determining when the equal protection clause required the state to
provide free access to litigants. The Court acknowledged that generally "[s]tates
are not forced by the Constitution to adjust all tolls to account for 'disparity in
material circumstances;"'57 as long as the fee they charge is uniform, the equal
protection clause is satisfied. But the Court identified two exceptions to this
principle. The first concerned "[t]he basic right to participate in political
5
" The second involved criminal or quasiprocesses"-the right at issue in Harper.
criminal cases.
M.L.B. located parental termination proceedings within this latter category.
The reason for treating parental terminations like divorce proceedings (where the
state must waive access fees),59 rather than like bankruptcies, or even appeals
from denials of public benefits (where the government was free to charge a
°
was because a fundamental interest was
reasonable and nondiscriminatory fee),W
at stake:
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance
in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the
State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. M.L.B.'s case,
involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond,
demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a
family association so undeniably important is at stake.6'
Precisely because this right was so important, the Court in prior cases held
that the appropriate burden of proof in parental termination cases was "clear and
convincing" evidence, rather than proof by a preponderance, 2 and that states
might sometimes be required to provide counsel to indigent parents. 6' A parent's
interest in having a continued relationship to his or her child was "commanding"
and "far more precious than any property right." In short, equal access was

56. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120-21 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 123-24 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
58. See id. at 124 n. 14 (describing Harperas the "pathmarking" case in this area).
59. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (concluding that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that indigent parties also have an opportunity to obtain a divorce).
60. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 445-46 (holding that bankruptcy filing fees pass rationality review under the
equal protection clause); Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 (appellate filing fees pass rationality review).
61. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116-17 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
62. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982).
63. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981). The Court, however, rejected the
requirement of an across-the-board provision of counsel.
64. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59.
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required because the right being adjudicated in the underlying proceeding was a
fundamental one.
The equal protection required by the Court's decision requires something that
falls between equal treatment and equal results. That is, equal protection forbids
the state from treating M.L.B. equally by imposing on her the same prepayment
requirement it imposes on everyone else. Instead, it requires giving her the same
ability to appeal that other litigants enjoy as a result of their ability to pay the
transcription fees and court costs. As I shall explain in more detail in Part IV,"
M.L.B. required "levelling up." And that requirement can be explained only by
importing due process into the equal protection inquiry.
Not only did substantive due process thus explain why the state was required
to permit M.L.B. a meaningful appeal regardless of her inability to pay otherwise
permissible fees, 66 but it also provided the majority with a response to the
dissent's claim that the decision would open the floodgates to all sorts of
litigation-access claims: the nature of the interest involved, and the severity of the
state impairment of that interest "sets parental status termination decrees apart
from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as
divorce, paternity, and child custody.' 67 Thus, the Court's decisions recognizing
fundamental constitutional rights in these cases "have not served as precedent in
other areas."' 8

III. ROMER V EVANS: How TAKING DUE PROCESS INTO
ACCOUNT REINFORCES THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION DECISION
In Bowers v. Hardwick,69 the Supreme Court rejected a substantive due
process challenge to the application of Georgia's sodomy statute to same-sex
sexual activity. 7° Against the historical background of prohibitions on same-sex
activity, the Court held that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"'-the verbal formulation for the kind of interests that trigger
substantive due process protection-"is, at best, facetious."71

65. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
66. In Draperv. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963), the Court explained that its decision in Griffin
did not require the state necessarily to provide indigent defendants with a complete trial transcript. It simply
required the state to provide some mechanism for indigent defendants to present their claims of trial error
effectively.
67. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127.
68. Id. at 128.
69. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70. As the dissent pointed out, the statute as written prohibited the conduct regardless of whether the
participants were of the same or different sexes. See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The fact that Georgia
apparently never enforced the statute in cases involving male-female couples, suggests the power of Jackson's
observation from Railway Express.
71. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
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While the possibility of using the due process clause to challenge
procedurally unfair or wholly arbitrary decisions remained open as a tool for
making molecular, if not molar, progress," Hardwick seemed to foreclose use of
the due process clause as a device for ratcheting up the level of judicial scrutiny
that applied to laws which targeted gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. So, not
surprisingly, in (perhaps unconscious) parallel to the Warren Court decisions
substituting substantive equal protection for substantive due process, litigants and
scholars turned to equal protection arguments for heightened scrutiny.73
That campaign hit an odd sort of pay dirt in Romer. The case concerned a
1992 amendment to the Colorado Constitution ("Amendment 2") that prohibited
state actors from adopting or enforcing measures that prohibited discrimination
against gays, lesbians, or bisexuals. 74
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court declared that Amendment 2
"defie[d]" a "conventional [equal protection] inquiry" and "confound[ed]" the
"normal process of judicial review., 75 Stripped of its somewhat confusing
verbiage, the central element of the Court's equal protection analysis was its
determination that the "sheer breadth" of Amendment 2 was so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the Amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects., 76 In other words, the Court
concluded that the goal of Amendment 2 was simply the "bare ...desire to harm
a politically unpopular group., 77 Since that "cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest,, 78 the Amendment failed even rationality review.
To my mind, there is a vacuum at the core of the Court's analysis that begs to
be filled. All sorts of laws reflect the majority's disapproval of ("animus toward")
an unpopular group, and yet are constitutional. To take just one example that

72.

For an account of the use of this strand of due process, see Eskridge, supra note 13.
73. For examples of post-Hardwick cases raising equal protection claims, see, e.g., High Tech Gays v.
Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995). For examples of scholarship advancing the
equal protection argument, see, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531
(1992); Sunstein, supra note 13.
74. The text of the amendment read:
Section

30b.

No Protected

Status

Based on Homosexual,

Lesbian,

or Bisexual

Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO.CONST., art. II, § 30b.
75. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 634-35 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).

78.

Id.
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shares some features with Amendment 2, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) specifically excludes "compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania"
from the otherwise capacious definition of conditions that can constitute
disabilities.79 Thus, compulsive gamblers, kleptomaniacs, and pyromaniacs are
excluded from the protections against discrimination in employment, public
accommodations, and the provision of government services afforded to all sorts
of other people who suffer from similar impairments (such as other compulsive
behaviors), not to mention people who are protected from discrimination by a
panoply of other federal statutes. The decision to exclude compulsive gamblers,
kleptomaniacs, and pyromaniacs from the protections others enjoy surely reflects
the majority's dislike of these politically unpopular groups. And yet, it is hard to
imagine the Supreme Court declaring the ADA unconstitutional for underbreadth.
More concretely, the Supreme Court decided in Hardwick that a Georgia statute
that threatened individuals with twenty years' imprisonment for engaging in
private, consensual same-sex behavior was rational because it reflected an
expression of the majority's "moral choices. ''80 Thus, it is not clear why a
majority's desire to express disapproval of homosexuality is an impermissible
government purpose.8' In Romer, the Court did not elaborate on the distinction, if
any, between expressing negative moral judgments and desiring to harm those
about whom one has those judgments.
I see two ways to explain why Amendment 2 fails equal protection inquiry.
Each depends on importing some due process-based notion of fundamental
liberty interests into the Court's equal protection analysis. The first, which
confronts head-on the continued vitality of Hardwick, focuses on the legitimacy
of the state's ends. The second, which resembles the analysis of the Colorado
Supreme Court,82 focuses on the permissibility of the state's means.
First, a liberty-based perspective may explain why a law aimed at stripping
protection from gays, lesbians, and bisexuals does not constitute a legitimate
government purpose, even if a law depriving, say, thieves, does. Understanding
the nature of the liberty interest in intimate association may explain why
discriminating among individuals on the basis of the choices they make is
impermissible. In a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1221 l(b)(2) (1994).
80. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 ("[R]espondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law
and that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law.
The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even
respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States
should be invalidated on this basis.").
81. I postpone for a moment the question whether, even if the expression of majoritarian moral
disapproval is a permissible purpose, Amendment 2, unlike the Georgia sodomy statute, pursues that goal
through impermissible means. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
82. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
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person's "ability independently to define [his or her] identity.., is central to any
concept of liberty."83 As Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick explained, "a
necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their
lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different
choices."' 4 If that choice is hedged about by state-sponsored or state-approved
discrimination, then gays and lesbians cannot make their choices freely. As I have
explained elsewhere, the regime challenged in Romer thus imposes an
unconstitutional condition:
[T]he state cannot demand that a person sacrifice the constitutionally
protected freedom "to choose the form and nature of the intensely
personal bonds" that "mak[e] individuals what they are" in order to enjoy
"protections taken for granted by most people ... against exclusion from
an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society."85
Perhaps the best judicial articulation of an integrated understanding of how
ideas of liberty can inform the understanding of equality for gays and lesbians
appears in Justice Albie Sachs's concurrence in the South African Constitutional
Court's 1998 decision in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Justice:"
The fact is that both from the point of view of the persons affected, as
well as from that of society as a whole, equality and privacy cannot be
separated, because they are both violated simultaneously by anti-sodomy
laws. In the present matter, such laws deny equal respect for difference,
which lies at the heart of equality, and become the basis for the invasion
of privacy. At the same time, the negation by the state of different forms
of intimate personal behaviour becomes the foundation for the
repudiation of equality. Human rights are better approached and
defended in an integrated rather than a disparate fashion. The rights must
fit the people, not the people the rights. This requires looking at rights
and their violations from a persons-centered rather than a formula-based
position, and analysing them contextually rather than abstractly."
If the activity targeted by Colorado had not implicated core liberty interests,
it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court declaring that the state's aim of

83. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
84. 478 U.S. at 205-06.
85. Pamela S. Karlan, Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Justice Blackmun, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 66 (1998) (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205, 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) and
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631).
86. 1998 (1) BCLR 1517 (CC), availableat http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/1998/gayles.html.
87. Id. at 112 (Sachs, J., concurring).
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expressing disapproval (as opposed to its means of pursuing that aim) was
illegitimate. What makes the end illegitimate must be that it targets individuals
who have an entitlement to differ from the majority's perspective. People do not
have a liberty interest in stealing; thus, denying antidiscrimination protection to
kleptomaniacs does not demand that they forego a constitutionally protected
interest. But people do have a liberty interest in the forms of intimate association
and assertion of identity that Amendment 2 targeted.
Second, as to the question whether Amendment 2 represents an
impermissible means under the equal protection clause, it turns out that the
means Amendment 2 uses trenches on another constitutionally protected liberty
interest: the right to participate on equal terms in the political process. The
problem with Amendment 2 was not that it deprived gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
of the right to nondiscrimination in the provision of housing, access to public
accommodations, government employment, or the like. Nothing in the Court's
opinion suggests that the equal protection clause requires states to enact
legislation barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Prior to
Amendment 2, gays who lived in most parts of Colorado had no protection
against discrimination by private actors, and were not constitutionally entitled to
any. What Amendment 2 denied gays was "the right to seek specific protection
from the law;"" it was a procedural, rather than a substantive, right. The way
Amendment 2 foreclosed this procedural right was to wipe out gains that gays
and their allies had already achieved through the political system, by enacting
municipal antidiscrimination ordinances and persuading the governor to issue
executive orders. Thus, while gays might be a politically unpopular group in
Colorado, they had not been entirely politically unsuccessful.
To see why I think that the core of the injury Amendment 2 inflicted
concerned the fundamental liberty interests that fit within the right to vote,
compare the following two passages:
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each
of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance
....
A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.
The State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it
more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size.

88.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added).
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The first, of course, is the central passage in Romer.89 But the second is an
excerpt from Hunter v. Erickson, ° the case on which the Colorado Supreme
Court had relied to hold that Amendment 2 infringed the fundamental right of
gays and lesbians to participate in the political process. 9' Hunter involved a
provision of the Akron, Ohio city charter that required fair housing ordinances to
be approved by popular referendum before going into effect. All other ordinances
became law simply upon passage by the city council. In explaining why the
Akron provision violated the equal protection clause, the Court employed a
stereoscopic approach. Not only did the provision target racial minorities-an
impermissible end-but it used an impermissible means as well: it placed
"special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process."9 In
fleshing out how Akron's black citizens were handicapped, the Court relied
primarily on malapportionment cases that had not raised claims of racial
discrimination at all; these were straightforward fundamental rights cases.93
Even if the Romer court refused to rely directly on the political participation
precedents, they were in the air. The fact that Amendment 2's discrimination
impaired the ability of gays to participate in one of the most protected aspects of
"civic life in a free society"94-the right to vote and to persuade elected officials to
adopt advantageous policies-may have begun to awaken the Court to the
invidiousness of antigay discrimination. In other words, the importance of
protecting gays against invidious discrimination may be driven home by
Colorado's extraordinary attempt to keep them from succeeding at the polls.
Thus, a more stereoscopic reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would reinforce
the Court's equal protection holding.
IV. BUSH V GORE: How TAKING DUE PROCESS INTO ACCOUNT
DISCREDITS THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION DECISION

By contrast to Romer-where a stereoscopic approach would have
strengthened the result the Supreme Court reached-Bush v. Gore provides an
example of a decision where a stereoscopic approach lays bare a fundamental
flaw with the result the Court reached.
The central question in Bush was the constitutionality of a manual recount
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court in the aftermath of an agonizingly close
presidential election. Then-Governor Bush challenged the recount on both equal

89. Id.
90. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
91. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d at 1279-85.
92. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 393 (relying on Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968)).
94. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
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protection and due process grounds, 9 and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that there was a violation of the equal protection clause. The Court
identified two key problems with the recount. First, it held that "Florida's basic
command . . . to consider the 'intent of the voter ' '96 was "standardless 97 and a
violation of the equal protection clause "in the absence of specific standards to
ensure its equal application."' 98 Without such standards, who examined a ballot
might determine whether that ballot was counted. Second, the Court found a
problem with the different treatment accorded to "undervotes" (ballots on which
machine tabulation had failed to detect a vote for President) and "overvotes"
(ballots that the tabulating machines rejected because there was more than one
vote cast for a presidential candidate).99Given these problems, which rendered the
recount as ordered unconstitutional, and its view that the problems could not be
cured within the available time, the Supreme Court "reverse[d] the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed,"' ° effectively ending
the election.
I do not propose to rehash here the question whether the Court was right to
identify an equal protection problem with the recount. 1 Instead, I want to focus
on the remedial issue: the Court's decision to halt the recount, rather than to
remand the case to order Florida to attempt a constitutionally sound recount.' 2
The failure to recognize the substantive due process angle enabled the Court to
ignore the fact that its remedy left thousands of votes uncounted in order to meet
a statutory deadline set far in advance of the date on which the Constitution itself
would require the election to be decided.
One of the most jarring statements in the per curiam's opinion was its
assertion that "[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote
for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to
appoint members of the Electoral College."'0'3 Thus, the per curiam suggested that
"[t]he State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of
Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors.' 1 4

95. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
96. Id. at 105-06.
97. Id. at 103.
98. Id. at 106.
99. Id. at 107-08.
100. Id. at 110.
101. For a more thorough discussion of that question, see PAMELA S. KARLAN, Equal Protection:Bush v.
Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001);
PAMELA S. KARLAN, The Newest Equal Protection:Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Pamela S. Karlan,
Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protectionfrom Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C.
L. REv. 1345 (2001).
102. The discussion that follows draws on Karlan, supra note 31.
103. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
104. Id.
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Of course? Not necessarily. The source for the proposition that states remain
free to strip otherwise eligible voters of the right to vote in presidential elections
was dicta in an 1892 decision, McPherson v. Blacker.'°5 Since then, there has
been a lot of water under the bridge. "History," as the per curiam acknowledged,
"has now favored the voter,"' ' and at least since 1876, every state has used
popular election to select its presidential electors. 0 7 As the Court has repeatedly
recognized, analysis of liberty interests is deeply informed by tradition, as
reflected in longstanding federal and state practices." A court sensitive to our
traditions of ordered liberty would have recognized that 125 years of popular
election had created a substantive liberty interest in voting to elect the president.
That interest, as it has evolved and solidified in the years since McPherson, a
case decided just three election cycles after the last legislative appointment of
electors, outweighs an Article II authorization that has fallen into desuetude. The
Fourteenth Amendment has simply evolved beyond the point at which a state can
strip citizens of their right to participate in choosing the president.
Why does this matter to the outcome in Bush v. Gore? Put simply, the five
Justices in the majority acted as if the only constitutional question was whether
the ballots that were being counted in the recount were being counted equally.
Taking the substantive due process interest in voting into account would have
forced the Court to also answer a different question: was Florida counting all the
ballots that should have been counted?
The per curiam opinion alluded dismissively to that question in passing,' 9 but
never really grappled with its implications. There were literally tens of thousands
of ballots statewide that machines had failed to count, many that contained votes
that would be eminently recoverable by a manual recount." The Court's remedy
left those ballots uncounted.

105. 146 U.S. I(1892).
106. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
107. Karlan, supra note 31, at 590.
108. The most elegant expression of this insight appears in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961):
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by
reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect
for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society ... having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which
it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.
See also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(adopting Justice Harlan's formulation).
109. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105 ("Respondents say that the very purpose of vindicating the right to vote
justifies the recount procedures now at issue.").
110. For discussion of this point, see, e.g., Ford Fessenden, Examining the Vote: The Method; How the
Consortium of News Organizations Conducted the Ballot Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001 at A17 (reporting
that a National Opinion Research Center study was able to determine voters' preferences on about twenty-four
thousand uncounted ballots in Florida); Shane, supra note 31.
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The stereoscopic approach the Court has generally taken in voting cases has
powerfully shaped remedial doctrine. In Harper, for example, the relief ordered
was to invalidate the poll tax and allow all voters to participate in the electoral
process, regardless of their ability to pay.'' The Court could, of course, have
assured equality by eliminating elections altogether; then, too, affluent and
indigent voters would be treated identically. But, particularly because the right to
vote is so fundamental, that kind of equalization would be absurd. The general
approach in contemporary equal protection law is that, faced with a finding of
unconstitutionality, courts will remedy the inequality by ordering the state to
provide the benefit to the previously excluded group (that is, by "levelling up"),
rather than by depriving the previously included group ("leveling down"). There
are very few examples of levelling down, and they never involve a right that
could be viewed as fundamental."'
Bush, with its monocular approach to equal protection, therefore flies in the
face of conventional remedial practice:
[It] is essentially a leveling down case: since Florida could not conduct a
manual recount that comported with the Supreme Court's definition of
equal protection within the constricted time period, the Court held
essentially that none of the as-yet uncounted votes should be included.
From the tactical perspective of candidate Bush, this was of course an
acceptable solution. But which voters had cognizable interests that were
vindicated by the Court's decision? Is there any voter who is better off
than she was before in a sense that the legal system can or should
recognize? 113
Ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court's remedy left more presumably legal
ballots uncounted than the Florida Supreme Court's ruling had and, if anything,
exacerbated the equal protection problem that some citizens' votes were recorded
while other citizens' votes were not.

11.

Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.

112. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.

2001, 2027 (1998). As Geof Stone warned in the First Amendment context:
There are dangers in the emphasis on equality, however, and those dangers should not be
overlooked. By focusing on equality, the Court may invite government to "equalize," not
by permitting more speech, but by adopting even more "suppressive" content-neutral
restrictions. This result, one might argue, is hardly consistent with the first amendment.
As Justice Rehnquist has observed, under the Court's approach, "the State would fare
better by adopting more restrictive means, a judicial incentive I had thought this Court
would hesitate to afford." Moreover, an undue emphasis on equality may lead the Court to
sustain "equal" restrictions on expression without sufficient consideration of the other
dangers such restrictions might pose.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 205 (1983).
113. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PiLDES, WHEN ELECnONs GO BAD: THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECION OF 2000, 177 (rev. ed. 2001).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Our former poet laureate, Robert Pinsky, once observed that "[a] country is
the things it wants to see. 1 1 4 As I hope this essay suggests, a stereoscopic
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment-one in which understandings of liberty
and equality inform one another-may change how courts come to see
constitutional issues, and may lead to fuller and more just answers. Thinking
about the Fourteenth Amendment from a stereoscopic perspective highlights the
contrast between Harper, where the Court's simultaneous reliance on ideas of
liberty and equality provided an impetus to the adoption of heightened scrutiny,
and Bush, where the Court's monocular focus on equal protection blinded it to
the mismatch between the violation it found and the remedy it ordered. At the
same time, understanding the interaction of due process and equal protection
concerns provides a firmer basis for the Court's decisions in Romer and M.L.B.
Thus, we might revise Justice Jackson's observation in Railway Express to say
that just as "[c]ourts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just
than to require that laws be equal in operation, ' so too, they often can have no
better measure of how to achieve the requirements of equality than to understand
the underlying claims of justice embodied in the due process clause's concept of
liberty.
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115. Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 113 (Jackson, J., concurring).

